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Medium

@hapi/wreck leaks sensitive `Proxy-Authorization` header across cross-hostname redirects

Affected versions

Affected versions
< 18.1.1
Fixed version
18.1.1
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-44979

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.42%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-18

Description

Impact

When @hapi/wreck follows a 3xx redirect to a different hostname, only the Authorization and Cookie headers are stripped. The standard credential header Proxy-Authorization is forwarded intact to the redirect target, potentially exposing forward-proxy credentials to a host outside the original trust boundary.

Redirect following is opt-in. The redirects option defaults to false (no redirections followed), so applications are only affected if they have explicitly set redirects to a positive integer on the request or via Wreck.defaults({ redirects: ... }).

Patches

@hapi/wreck 18.1.1 extends the cross-hostname strip set to include proxy-authorization. Upgrade to 18.1.1 or later.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

  • Leave redirects at its default (false) — applications that never enable redirect following are not affected.

  • If redirects are required, set redirects: 0 when calling endpoints with sensitive headers, or strip Proxy-Authorization from the headers before issuing the request.

  • Use the beforeRedirect hook to manually strip proxy-authorization (and any other sensitive application headers) when redirectOptions targets a different hostname than the original request.

Resources

Links

Credits

  • gasbugs