Affected versions
- Affected versions
- < 2026.5.20
- Fixed version
- 2026.5.20
Exploitation
Description
Summary
OpenClaw hook ingress can start automated agent runs using a configured hook token. In affected releases, a hook-triggered run could select a bundled CLI backend that received owner-scoped MCP loopback authority instead of a scope appropriate for hook ingress.
This issue affects the boundary between hook-token automation and owner-only MCP tools. It does not affect deployments with hooks disabled.
Affected configurations
This affects deployments where hooks are enabled, /hooks/agent is reachable with a valid hook token, and a bundled CLI backend can be selected for the hook-triggered run.
Impact
A caller with the hook token could cause the spawned CLI runtime to see or call MCP tools that should have been owner-only. The practical impact depends on which MCP tools are available; the reported proof used persistent cron state as a representative owner-only action.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.20.
Fixed in the 2026.5.20 stable release.
Mitigations
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.20 or later. Keep hook tokens secret, restrict network access to hook endpoints, and disable hooks when they are not needed.
Links
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6fvr-66p3-3qj4
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6fvr-66p3-3qj4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53814
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-privilege-escalation-via-hook-triggered-cli-mcp-tool-authority
Credits
- cantinagen
- Ellahinator

