All reports
Medium

league/commonmark has an embed extension allowed_domains bypass

Affected versions

Affected versions
>= 2.3.0, <= 2.8.1
Fixed version
2.8.2

Exploitation

CVE-2026-33347

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.28%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Impact

The DomainFilteringAdapter in the Embed extension is vulnerable to an allowlist bypass due to a missing hostname boundary assertion in the domain-matching regex. An attacker-controlled domain like youtube.com.evil passes the allowlist check when youtube.com is an allowed domain.

This enables two attack vectors:

  • SSRF: The OscaroteroEmbedAdapter makes server-side HTTP requests to the embed URL via the embed/embed library. A bypassed domain filter causes the server to make outbound requests to an attacker-controlled host, potentially probing internal services or exfiltrating request metadata.

  • XSS: EmbedRenderer outputs the oEmbed response HTML directly into the page with no sanitization. An attacker controlling the bypassed domain can return arbitrary HTML/JavaScript in their oEmbed response, which is rendered verbatim.

Any application using the Embed extension and relying on allowed_domains to restrict domains when processing untrusted Markdown input is affected.

Patches

This has been patched in version 2.8.2. The fix replaces the regex-based domain check with explicit hostname parsing using parse_url(), ensuring exact domain and subdomain matching only.

Workarounds
  • Disable the Embed extension, or restrict its use to trusted users

  • Provide your own domain-filtering implementation of EmbedAdapterInterface

  • Enable a Content Security Policy (CSP) and outbound firewall restrictions

Links

Credits

  • HuajiHD