All reports
Low

LangChain affected by SSRF via image_url token counting in ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Affected versions
<1.2.11
Fixed version
1.2.11
Affected versions
< 1.2.11
Fixed version
1.2.11
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-26013

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.42%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-18

Description

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in ChatOpenAI Image Token Counting

Summary

The ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages() method fetches arbitrary image_url values without validation when computing token counts for vision-enabled models. This allows attackers to trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by providing malicious image URLs in user input.

Severity

Low - The vulnerability allows SSRF attacks but has limited impact due to:

  • Responses are not returned to the attacker (blind SSRF)

  • Default 5-second timeout limits resource exhaustion

  • Non-image responses fail at PIL image parsing

Impact

An attacker who can control image URLs passed to get_num_tokens_from_messages() can:

  • Trigger HTTP requests from the application server to arbitrary internal or external URLs

  • Cause the server to access internal network resources (private IPs, cloud metadata endpoints)

  • Cause minor resource consumption through image downloads (bounded by timeout)

Note: This vulnerability occurs during token counting, which may happen outside of model invocation (e.g., in logging, metrics, or token budgeting flows).

Details

The vulnerable code path:

  1. get_num_tokens_from_messages() processes messages containing image_url content blocks

  2. For images without detail: "low", it calls _url_to_size() to fetch the image and compute token counts

  3. _url_to_size() performs httpx.get(image_source) on any URL without validation

  4. Prior to the patch, there was no SSRF protection, size limits, or explicit timeout

File: libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in langchain-openai==1.1.9 (requires langchain-core==1.2.11).

The patch adds:

  1. SSRF validation using langchain_core._security._ssrf_protection.validate_safe_url() to block:

    • Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local)

    • Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc.)

    • Invalid URL schemes

  2. Explicit size limits (50 MB maximum, matching OpenAI's payload limit)

  3. Explicit timeout (5 seconds, same as httpx.get default)

  4. Allow disabling image fetching via allow_fetching_images=False parameter

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately:

  1. Sanitize input: Validate and filter image_url values before passing messages to token counting or model invocation

  2. Use network controls: Implement egress filtering to prevent outbound requests to private IPs

Links

Credits

  • Finder16