Affected versions
Version ranges need review.
- Affected versions
- <0.10.1
- Fixed version
- 0.10.1
- Affected versions
- <= 0.10.0
- Fixed version
- 0.10.1
Exploitation
Description
Summary
All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.
Details
Each acquire() call performs a TransactWriteItems (or UpdateItem in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing ProvisionedThroughputExceededException.
The library has no built-in mitigation:
No partition key sharding/salting
No write coalescing or batching
No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
RateLimiterUnavailableis raised but the caller has already been delayed
Impact
Availability: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
Fairness: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
Multi-tenant risk: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others
Reproduction
Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
Observe DynamoDB
ThrottledRequestsCloudWatch metric increasingObserve
acquire()latency spikes andRateLimiterUnavailableexceptions
Remediation Design: Pre-Shard Buckets
Move buckets to
PK={ns}/BUCKET#{entity}#{resource}#{shard}, SK=#STATE— one partition per (entity, resource, shard)Auto-inject
wcu:1000reserved limit on every bucket — tracks DynamoDB partition write pressure in-band (name may change during implementation)Shard doubling (1→2→4→8) triggered by client on
wcuexhaustion or proactively by aggregatorShard 0 at suffix
#0is source of truth forshard_count. Aggregator propagates to other shardsOriginal limits stored on bucket, effective limits derived:
original / shard_count. Infrastructure limits (wcu) not dividedShard selection: random/round-robin. On application limit exhaustion, retry on another shard (max 2 retries)
Lazy shard creation on first access
Bucket discovery via GSI3 (KEYS_ONLY) + BatchGetItem. GSI2 for resource aggregation unchanged
Cascade: parent unaware, protected by own
wcuAggregator: parse new PK format, key by shard_id, effective limits for refill, filter
wcufrom snapshotsClean break migration: schema version bump, old buckets ignored, new buckets created on first access
$0.625/M preserved on hot path
Links
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m6
- https://github.com/zeroae/zae-limiter
- https://github.com/zeroae/zae-limiter/commit/481ce44d818d66e31d8837bc48519660ce4c267f
- https://github.com/zeroae/zae-limiter/releases/tag/v0.10.1
- https://github.com/zeroae/zae-limiter/security/advisories/GHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27695
- https://pypi.org/project/zae-limiter
Credits
- sodre

