All reports
Medium

zeroconf has unbounded DNS record cache that allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via multicast flood

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Affected versions
<0.149.7
Fixed version
0.149.7
Affected versions
< 0.149.7
Fixed version
0.149.7
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-47184

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.39%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Impact

DNSCache._async_add inserted every response record into cache, _expirations, _expire_heap, and service_cache with no cap on entry count. The only pre-existing protection was a PTR TTL floor (_DNS_PTR_MIN_TTL = 1125 s, RFC 6762 §10), which actually prolonged attacker-injected records, and a periodic async_expire on _CACHE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 10 s that could not keep up with a flood.

Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, 224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) can multicast valid mDNS responses with unique names (RFC 6762 §11 allows up to 253 bytes each) and watch them accumulate. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, every cache lookup and every periodic expiry pass grows linearly slower, starving asyncio and breaking unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). A second variant — re-multicasting cached records with shifting TTLs — grows _expire_heap unbounded between cleanup runs without touching cache or _total_records.

Patches

Fixed in zeroconf 0.149.6 (PR #1718). Upgrade to >= 0.149.6.

Workarounds

There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.

Resources

Links