All reports
High

tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Affected versions
<6.5.6
Fixed version
6.5.6
Affected versions
< 6.5.6
Fixed version
6.5.6
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-49855

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.57%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Tornado's gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total compressed size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. HTTPServer is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if decompress_request=True is set.

This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. max_body_size is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.

Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting decompress_response=False or using CurlAsyncHTTPClient.

Links

Credits

  • yuui25