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Medium

plone.app.textfield: Stored XSS by spoofing mime type

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Affected versions
<2.0.2 || >=3.0.0 <3.0.2 || >=4.0.0 <4.0.1
Fixed version
2.0.2 · 3.0.2 · 4.0.1
Affected versions
= 4.0.0
Fixed version
4.0.1
Affected versions
>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.2
Fixed version
3.0.2
Affected versions
< 2.0.2
Fixed version
2.0.2

Exploitation

CVE-2026-54503

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.40%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Impact

A stored XSS affecting RichText fields. RichTextValue.output returns the raw, unsanitized stored value whenever the stored mimeType equals the outputMimeType. Because the safe-HTML output type (text/x-html-safe) is the type that signifies "already sanitized", any value whose stored mimeType equals it bypasses the safe_html transform entirely on render. The transform itself is sound — it correctly strips on* event-handler attributes and javascript:/data: URIs; the defect is that it is never invoked for these values. The unsanitized value is then emitted via tal:content="structure ...", which performs no escaping, so the payload executes in the viewer's browser.

This can be a problem when a RichText field is wrongly defined in code with a mimeType and outputMimeType that are the same, or when the REST API is used to the same effect.

Patches

The problem has been patched:

  • For Plone 6.0, upgrade plone.app.textfield to 2.0.2.

  • For Plone 6.1, upgrade plone.app.textfield to 3.0.2.

  • For Plone 6.2, upgrade plone.app.textfield to 4.0.1.

Workarounds

There is no known workaround.

Links

Credits

  • gyst