All reports
Medium

Gogs has arbitrary file read/write via Path Traversal in Git hook editing

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Affected versions
<= 0.13.3
Fixed version
0.13.4
Affected versions
*
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-23633

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.51%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Vulnerability Description

In the endpoint:

/username/reponame/settings/hooks/git/:name

the :name parameter:

  • Is URL-decoded by macaron routing, allowing decoded slashes (/)

  • Is then passed directly to:

git.Repository.Hook("custom_hooks", name)

which internally resolves the path as:

filepath.Join(repoPath, "custom_hooks", name)

Because no path sanitization is applied, supplying ../ sequences allows access to arbitrary paths outside the repository.

As a Result:
  • GET: Arbitrary file contents are displayed in the hook edit page textarea (Local File Inclusion).

  • POST: Existing files can be overwritten with attacker-controlled content (Arbitrary File Write).


Attack Prerequisites

  • The attacker is an authenticated user

  • The attacker has Admin or higher privileges on the target repository

  • The attacker has the AllowGitHook permission (or is a site administrator)

  • The target file is readable/writable by the Gogs process OS permissions


Attack Scenario

  1. An attacker (with AllowGitHook + repository Admin privileges) accesses the Git hook edit URL

  2. A path containing ../ is supplied in :name, fully URL-encoded using %2f

  3. The server resolves custom_hooks/../../... without validation

  4. Arbitrary file contents are displayed and existing files can be overwritten


Potential Impact

  • Sensitive information disclosure: app.ini, databases, logs, environment variables, etc.

  • Configuration or data tampering: Overwriting existing files

  • Secondary impact: Extraction of SECRET_KEY and database credentials may allow token forging or further compromise

Links

Credits

  • odgrso