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Critical

RClone: Unauthenticated operations/fsinfo allows attacker-controlled backend instantiation and local command execution

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Affected versions
>=1.48.0
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
>=1.49.0 <1.73.5
Fixed version
1.73.5
Affected versions
>= 1.48.0, <= 1.73.4
Fixed version
1.73.5

Exploitation

CVE-2026-41179

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 8.59%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-19

Description

Summary

The RC endpoint operations/fsinfo is exposed without AuthRequired: true and accepts attacker-controlled fs input. Because rc.GetFs(...) supports inline backend definitions, an unauthenticated attacker can instantiate an attacker-controlled backend on demand. For the WebDAV backend, bearer_token_command is executed during backend initialization, making single-request unauthenticated local command execution possible on reachable RC deployments without global HTTP authentication.

Preconditions

Preconditions for this vulnerability are:

  • The rclone remote control API must be enabled, either by the --rc flag or by running the rclone rcd server

  • The remote control API must be reachable by the attacker - by default rclone only serves the rc to localhost unless the --rc-addr flag is in use

  • The rc must have been deployed without global RC HTTP authentication - so not using --rc-user/--rc-pass/--rc-htpasswd/etc

Details

The root cause consists of the following pieces:

  1. operations/fsinfo is not protected with AuthRequired: true

  2. operations/fsinfo calls rc.GetFs(...) on attacker-controlled input

  3. rc.GetFs(...) supports inline backend creation through object-valued fs

  4. WebDAV backend initialization executes bearer_token_command

Relevant code paths:

  • fs/operations/rc.go

    • operations/fsinfo is registered without AuthRequired: true

    • rcFsInfo() calls rc.GetFs(ctx, in)

  • fs/rc/cache.go

    • GetFs() / GetFsNamed() can parse an object-valued fs

    • getConfigMap() converts attacker-controlled JSON into a backend config string

  • backend/webdav/webdav.go

    • bearer_token_command is a supported backend option

    • NewFs(...) calls fetchAndSetBearerToken() when bearer_token_command is set

    • fetchBearerToken() invokes exec.Command(...)

This creates a practical single-request unauthenticated command-execution primitive on reachable RC servers without global HTTP authentication.

This was alidated on:

  • current master as of 2026-04-14: bf55d5e6d37fd86164a87782191f9e1ffcaafa82

  • latest public release tested locally: v1.73.4

This was also validated on a public amd64 Ubuntu host controlled by the tester, using direct host execution (not containerized PoC execution).

PoC
Minimal single-request form PoC

Start a vulnerable RC server:

rclone rcd --rc-addr 127.0.0.1:5572

No --rc-user, no --rc-pass, no --rc-htpasswd.

Then send a single request:

curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:5572/operations/fsinfo \
  --data-urlencode "fs=:webdav,url='http://127.0.0.1/',vendor=other,bearer_token_command='/usr/bin/touch /tmp/rclone_fsinfo_rce_poc_marker':"

Expected result:

  • HTTP 200 JSON response from operations/fsinfo

  • /tmp/rclone_fsinfo_rce_poc_marker is created on the host

Impact

This is effectively a single-request unauthenticated command-execution vulnerability on reachable RC deployments without global HTTP authentication.

In practice, command execution in the rclone process context can lead to higher-impact outcomes such as local file read, file write, or shell access, depending on the deployed environment.

Testing performed

This was successfully reproduced:

  • on a local test environment

  • on a public amd64 Ubuntu host controlled by the tester

On the public host it was confirmed:

  • the unauthenticated operations/fsinfo exploit worked

  • command execution occurred on the host

  • the issue was reproducible through direct host execution

Links

Credits

  • 0wnerDied
  • ncw
  • augustocesarperin