All reports
High

Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Rust / Cargoquinn-proto
Affected versions
>= 0.11.0, < 0.11.7
Fixed version
0.11.7
Rust / Cargoquinn-proto
Affected versions
>=0.11.0 <0.11.7
Fixed version
0.11.7

Exploitation

CVE-2024-45311

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.57%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-18

Description

Summary

As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to accept(), retry(), refuse(), or ignore() an Incoming connection. However, calling retry() on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations:

  • Calling refuse or ignore on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received

    • This issue can go undetected until a server's refuse()/ignore() code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack.

  • Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received.

    • This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved.

The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Details

Location of panic: https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/blob/bb02a12a8435a7732a1d762783eeacbb7e50418e/quinn-proto/src/endpoint.rs#L213

Impact

Denial of service for internet-facing server

Links

Credits

  • finnbear
  • BiagioFesta