All reports
Medium

openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption

Affected versions

Version ranges need review.

Rust / Cargoopenssl-src
Affected versions
>= 300.0.0, < 300.0.12
Fixed version
300.0.12
Rust / Cargoopenssl-src
Affected versions
< 111.25.0
Fixed version
111.25.0
Rust / Cargoopenssl-src
Affected versions
>=0.0.0-0 <111.25.0 || >=300.0.0 <300.0.12
Fixed version
111.25.0 · 300.0.12
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2022-4304

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 23.51%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.

Links

Credits

  • another-rex