All reports
High

Netty: HAProxy SSL TLV parsing leaks retained slice on invalid TLV length

Affected versions

Affected versions
<= 4.1.134.Final
Fixed version
4.1.135.Final
Affected versions
>= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final
Fixed version
4.2.15.Final
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-44893

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.62%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

When decoding a PP2_TYPE_SSL TLV, HAProxyMessage.readNextTLV() first calls header.retainedSlice(header.readerIndex(), length) and only then reads the 1-byte client field and 4-byte verify field. If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException. HAProxyMessageDecoder only catches HAProxyProtocolException around this call, so the IOOBE propagates and the retained slice on the pooled cumulation buffer is never released.

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