All reports
Medium

rabbitmq-server: RabbitMQ: Denial of Service via AMQP 0-9-1 body size validation bypass

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-67235

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.30%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15, The content-header BodySize (a uint64) was stored without validation against max_message_size. The size check ran only when assembly completed. By declaring body_size = 2^63-1 and then streaming fragments, a client ensured that check_msg_size never fired, so the accumulated body size went unbounded. A reader process accumulates memory until the memory alarm fires, degrading all publishers cluster-wide, or until the node runs out of memory. The memory alarm provides only partial mitigation, since it is reactive rather than preventive. AMQP 0-9-1 is the most widely used protocol, and any publisher can trigger this condition. Preconditions include Any authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permission can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15.

A flaw was found in RabbitMQ. An authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permissions can exploit a vulnerability in the body assembly process. By declaring an extremely large BodySize and streaming message fragments, the client can bypass size validation, leading to unbounded memory accumulation. This can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by degrading publisher performance cluster-wide or by exhausting the node's memory.