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Medium

rabbitmq: RabbitMQ: Information disclosure of decrypted Shovel URIs in debug logs

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-66068

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.14%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-19

Description

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, ?LOG_DEBUG("shutting down Shovel '~ts', ... Shovel state: ~tp", [Name, State]) formats the entire state map. The 'uris' field holds plaintext URIs after credentials_obfuscation:decrypt (called in rabbit_shovel_util:deobfuscated_uris/2). No format_status/1,2 callback exists in rabbit_shovel_worker to redact it. Triggered when an autodelete shovel (src-delete-after = N) completes. With DEBUG logging enabled, autodelete-shovel completion writes the full shovel state map , including decrypted amqp://user:password@host/ URIs , to the broker log file. Preconditions include Shovel plugin enabled with URI-embedded credentials DEBUG log level (non-default) Autodelete shovel configuration Attacker has log read access. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

A flaw was found in RabbitMQ, a messaging and streaming broker. When the Shovel plugin is enabled with URI-embedded credentials and debug logging is active, the completion of an autodelete shovel can cause decrypted AMQP (Advanced Message Queuing Protocol) URIs, including usernames and passwords, to be written to the broker's log file. An attacker with access to the log files could exploit this to obtain sensitive credentials, leading to unauthorized access to the messaging broker.