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Medium

kernel: dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
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Unknown
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Unknown
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Affected versions
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Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-90333

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.17%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker The discard-block check in dm_integrity_rw_tag() treats a stored tag of all 0xf6 bytes (DISCARD_FILLER) as proof a block was discarded and skips HMAC verification. allow_discards is only accepted in dm-integrity's standalone mode. An attacker with raw write access to the backing device, but without the integrity key, can stamp any block with an all-0xf6 tag and have it served as authentic. Add a new "allow_discards_keyed" target argument that marks discarded blocks with a keyed checksum of (salt || sector) instead, computed by integrity_discard_checksum().

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's device-mapper integrity (dm-integrity) target. This vulnerability allows an attacker with raw write access to the backing device, but without the integrity key, to bypass data integrity checks. By stamping any block with a specially crafted discard filler tag, the attacker can make the system treat the block as authentically discarded, leading to a data integrity bypass. This could result in unauthorized data manipulation or corruption.