All reports
High

kernel: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2()

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-89633

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.55%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-20

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a pointer below the actual byte area, overwriting header fields; a large one can push it past the buffer end, causing out-of-bounds heap reads (source) or writes (target). The BCC overflow guard does not prevent this: BCC reflects how much data is present, while DataOffset controls where in the buffer it starts. The "validate target area" comment present since the function was first written in 2005 was a placeholder that was never implemented. Add lower- and upper-bound checks for both data pointers before the memcpy, and before any target header fields are modified.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Server Message Block (SMB) client. The coalesce_t2() function processes server-supplied DataOffset fields without proper validation against buffer boundaries. A remote attacker could exploit this by crafting malicious SMB responses. This could lead to out-of-bounds read and write operations, potentially resulting in information disclosure or arbitrary code execution.