All reports
High

grafana: Grafana: Session takeover via Auth Proxy cache key collision

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-14199

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.33%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

Only self-managed Grafana instances with Auth Proxy authentication and identity caching enabled (sync_ttl greater than zero) are affected. The Auth Proxy cache key concatenated the username and forwarded identity attributes without a delimiter, so distinct identities could collide on one key. An authenticated user who shapes their own attributes to collide with a higher-privileged user's, while that user's cache entry is live, is authenticated as that user, up to Administrator (authentication bypass by spoofing).

On instances using Auth Proxy header authentication ([auth.proxy]) with identity caching enabled (sync_ttl > 0), two distinct user identities could produce the same cache key. An authenticated low-privileged user able to influence their own forwarded identity attributes could be served a higher-privileged user's cached session and act as that user for the duration of the cache TTL. Default configurations are not affected.