All reports
Medium

kernel: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-72300

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.21%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-19

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ASoC) Sound Open Firmware (SOF) topology component. The sof_parse_token_sets() function fails to properly validate the size of the vendor array when parsing topology private data. A local attacker could exploit this by providing malformed topology data, leading to an out-of-bounds read. This could result in system instability or a denial of service.