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Medium

kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via infinite loop in dm-integrity discard handling

Affected versions

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Exploitation

CVE-2026-99135

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.22%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: fix infinite loop on discard with large tag size When integrity_metadata handles a discard, it fills a buffer with DISCARD_FILLER and writes it over the tags, max_blocks blocks at a time. If the kmalloc fails, the buffer is the on-stack array checksums_onstack and max_size is set to HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE. So if the tag size is larger than HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE, max_blocks is zero, bi_size is never decremented and the loop never terminates. Fix this by using sizeof(checksums_onstack) as max_size. The array has MAX_TAG_SIZE bytes since commit b93b6643e9b5 ("dm integrity: fix a crash with unusually large tag size"), so max_blocks is at least 1.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Device Mapper integrity (dm-integrity) subsystem. When processing storage discard requests under low-memory conditions with large integrity tag sizes, an error-handling path fails to properly advance the processing loop. A local user could exploit this condition to trigger an infinite loop in the kernel, leading to a system hang and a Denial of Service (DoS).