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Medium

openstack-designate: designate: cross-tenant DNS zone overlap via pool-scoped ownership checks when using AttributeFilter scheduler

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-71193

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.53%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-18

Description

In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.1, zone creation checks (_is_subzone, _is_superzone, and the duplicate-zone DB constraint) are scoped to the target pool only. An authenticated user can bypass these checks by scheduling a zone to a different pool via the AttributeFilter scheduler, creating an overlapping zone that conflicts with another tenant's zone. This enables cross-tenant DNS hijack (redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled IPs) and DNS denial of service (NODATA responses). Exploitation requires a multi-pool deployment with AttributeFilter enabled in scheduler_filters, which is a non-default but documented and supported configuration for self-service tiering.

A flaw was found in OpenStack Designate. When the AttributeFilter scheduler is enabled with multiple DNS pools, an authenticated tenant can bypass zone ownership checks by scheduling a zone to a different pool. The database uniqueness constraint on zone names is pool-scoped, and the subzone/superzone ownership checks in the Central service include pool_id in their query criteria, making them pool-scoped rather than global. This allows a tenant to create zones that overlap with another tenant's zones in a different pool, bypassing cross-tenant namespace isolation. Successful exploitation could lead to cross-tenant DNS zone overlap and subzone ownership bypass.