Affected versions
- Affected versions
- Unknown
- Fixed version
- Not reported
- Affected versions
- Unknown
- Fixed version
- Not reported
- Affected versions
- Unknown
- Fixed version
- Not reported
- Affected versions
- Unknown
- Fixed version
- Not reported
Exploitation
Description
In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.1, zone creation checks (_is_subzone, _is_superzone, and the duplicate-zone DB constraint) are scoped to the target pool only. An authenticated user can bypass these checks by scheduling a zone to a different pool via the AttributeFilter scheduler, creating an overlapping zone that conflicts with another tenant's zone. This enables cross-tenant DNS hijack (redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled IPs) and DNS denial of service (NODATA responses). Exploitation requires a multi-pool deployment with AttributeFilter enabled in scheduler_filters, which is a non-default but documented and supported configuration for self-service tiering.
A flaw was found in OpenStack Designate. When the AttributeFilter scheduler is enabled with multiple DNS pools, an authenticated tenant can bypass zone ownership checks by scheduling a zone to a different pool. The database uniqueness constraint on zone names is pool-scoped, and the subzone/superzone ownership checks in the Central service include pool_id in their query criteria, making them pool-scoped rather than global. This allows a tenant to create zones that overlap with another tenant's zones in a different pool, bypassing cross-tenant namespace isolation. Successful exploitation could lead to cross-tenant DNS zone overlap and subzone ownership bypass.

