All reports
Medium

kernel: io_uring/waitid: clear waitid info before copying it to userspace

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-46315

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.11%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/waitid: clear waitid info before copying it to userspace IORING_OP_WAITID stores its result fields in struct io_waitid::info and later copies them to userspace siginfo. The prep path initializes the request arguments, but it does not initialize info itself. If the wait operation completes without reporting a child event, the common wait code can return without writing wo_info. In that case io_waitid_finish() still copies iw->info to userspace, exposing stale bytes from the reused io_kiocb command storage. Clear the result storage during prep so the io_uring path matches the regular waitid syscall, which uses a zero-initialized struct waitid_info.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's io_uring subsystem, specifically within the IORING_OP_WAITID operation. This vulnerability occurs because the waitid information structure is not properly initialized before being copied to userspace. A local user could exploit this to expose stale data from previously used kernel memory, leading to information disclosure.