All reports
Medium

kernel: slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-45843

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.40%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length slhc_uncompress() parses a VJ-compressed TCP header by advancing a pointer through the packet via decode() and pull16(). Neither helper bounds-checks against isize, and decode() masks its return with & 0xffff so it can never return the -1 that callers test for -- those error paths are dead code. A short compressed frame whose change byte requests optional fields lets decode() read past the end of the packet. The over-read bytes are folded into the cached cstate and reflected into subsequent reconstructed packets. Make decode() and pull16() take the packet end pointer and return -1 when exhausted. Add a bounds check before the TCP-checksum read. The existing == -1 tests now do what they were always meant to.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Serial Line Internet Protocol (SLIP) implementation. The slhc_uncompress() function, which handles VJ-compressed TCP headers, fails to perform proper bounds checks during packet processing. A remote attacker could exploit this by sending a specially crafted compressed frame, causing an out-of-bounds read. This vulnerability may lead to information disclosure or data corruption in subsequent reconstructed packets.