Affected versions
- Affected versions
- Unknown
- Fixed version
- Not reported
- Affected versions
- Unknown
- Fixed version
- Not reported
Exploitation
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix user-after-free This uses l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() after calling __l2cap_get_chan_blah() to prevent the following trace: Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:static void l2cap_chan_destroy(struct kref *kref) Bluetooth: chan 0000000023c4974d Bluetooth: parent 00000000ae861c08
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_waiter_is_first kernel/locking/mutex.c:191 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:671 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x278/0x400 kernel/locking/mutex.c:729 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888006a49b08 by task kworker/u3:2/389
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Bluetooth Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) subsystem. This flaw allows an adjacent attacker within Bluetooth radio range to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) through a system crash. A use-after-free vulnerability occurs due to missing reference count checks during concurrent channel creation and teardown operations. By rapidly initiating and closing Bluetooth connections, an attacker can trigger this race condition, causing the kernel to access already freed memory.

