All reports
Medium

nss: new tlsfuzzer code can still detect timing issues in RSA operations

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2023-4421

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.76%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-20

Description

The NSS code used for checking PKCS#1 v1.5 was leaking information useful in mounting Bleichenbacher-like attacks. Both the overall correctness of the padding as well as the length of the encrypted message was leaking through timing side-channel. By sending large number of attacker-selected ciphertexts, the attacker would be able to decrypt a previously intercepted PKCS#1 v1.5 ciphertext (for example, to decrypt a TLS session that used RSA key exchange), or forge a signature using the victim's key. The issue was fixed by implementing the implicit rejection algorithm, in which the NSS returns a deterministic random message in case invalid padding is detected, as proposed in the Marvin Attack paper. This vulnerability affects NSS < 3.61.

A vulnerability was found in NSS. The interface between the cryptographic library (the softokn) and the rest of NSS is using PKCS#11, and the error reporting (erroring out when the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding checks fail) that PKCS#11 requires is very noisy, making it easy to detect over the network.