All reports
Medium

kernel: vxlan: vnifilter: enforce exact length of GROUP/GROUP6 attributes

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-89776

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.21%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-19

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: vnifilter: enforce exact length of GROUP/GROUP6 attributes The VXLAN VNI filter entry policy declares the GROUP/GROUP6 address attributes as NLA_BINARY with only a maximum length, so validate_nla() accepts a payload shorter than the address. The GROUP consumer reads it with nla_get_in_addr(), an unconditional 4-byte load, so a short attribute over-reads up to 3 bytes of uninitialised slab data, which are stored into remote_ip and echoed back via RTM_GETTUNNEL, disclosing kernel memory. Switch both entries to NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() so the validator rejects any GROUP/GROUP6 that is not exactly 4 / 16 bytes; a valid address is always sent at full width.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's VXLAN VNI filter. The system does not enforce an exact length for GROUP/GROUP6 address attributes. A remote attacker could exploit this by sending a malformed attribute, leading to an over-read of uninitialized kernel memory. This information is then disclosed back to the attacker, resulting in an information disclosure vulnerability.