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kernel: drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop

Affected versions

Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-89819

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.16%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-20

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop Unlike the CRTC degamma path, which is guarded by amdgpu_dm_verify_lut_sizes(), the per-plane degamma LUT size was never validated before use. __set_dm_plane_degamma() passed the user-supplied size straight into __is_lut_linear() and, for a non-linear LUT, into __set_input_tf() -> __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(), the latter always iterating MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES entries regardless of the actual LUT size. A malformed AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT blob (e.g. a single entry) could thus trigger a divide-by-zero in __is_lut_linear() or an out-of-bounds read in __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(). Reject any plane degamma LUT whose size does not match MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES, mirroring the invariant the code already asserts a few lines below (and which the CRTC path enforces). The AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT property is only exposed on builds with AMD_PRIVATE_COLOR defined.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's drm/amd/display component. This vulnerability arises from insufficient validation of the plane degamma Look-Up Table (LUT) size. A local attacker, with access to the AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT property (available on systems with AMD_PRIVATE_COLOR defined), could provide a malformed input. This could lead to a divide-by-zero error, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS), or an out-of-bounds read, potentially causing information disclosure.