All reports
Medium

EGroupware: User-Controlled Identity Provider Selection in SAML Authentication

Affected versions

Affected versions
< 23.1.20260601
Fixed version
23.1.20260601
Affected versions
>= 26.0.20251208, < 26.6.20260616
Fixed version
26.6.20260616

Exploitation

CVE-2026-63672

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.20%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-20

Description

Summary

The login() function at line 130 passes the raw user-supplied value $_REQUEST['idp'] directly to SimpleSAMLphp's requireAuth() with only a regex check that the string starts with 'https://'. No validation is performed against a list of configured, trusted IdP entity IDs. An unauthenticated attacker can supply any HTTPS URL pointing to an IdP they control.

PoC
//api/src/Auth/Saml.php
function login()
	{
		// login (redirects to IdP)
		$as = new SimpleSAML\Auth\Simple(self::$auth_source);
		$as->requireAuth(preg_match('|^https://|', $_REQUEST['idp']) ?
			['saml:idp' => $_REQUEST['idp']] : []);

Impact

An attacker can redirect authentication to a malicious IdP to capture credentials via phishing, or, if the SimpleSAMLphp configuration does not strictly validate IdP metadata, issue forged SAML assertions to authenticate as any user, including administrators.

Remediation

Validate the idp request parameter against a pre-configured whitelist of trusted IdP entity IDs stored in the application's SAML configuration. Reject and log any idp value not explicitly present in the trusted list before calling requireAuth().

Links

Credits

  • smitocaru