All reports
Medium

DNSSEC validation accepted an unrelated signed RRset as the answer (hickory-proto)

Affected versions

Rust / Cargohickory-net
Affected versions
>=0.0.0-0 <0.26.2
Fixed version
0.26.2
Rust / Cargohickory-proto
Affected versions
>=0.0.0-0 <0.26.0-beta.1
Fixed version
0.26.0-beta.1

Exploitation

CVE-2026-123581

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.13%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-19

Description

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation treated a response with a non-empty answer section as a positive answer if its records validated, without checking that any of them matched the queried name and type. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could return a genuine signed RRset for another name or type and have it accepted as a validated answer.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

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