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OpenZeppelin Contracts using MerkleProof multiproofs may allow proving arbitrary leaves for specific trees

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 4.7.0, < 4.9.2
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
4.9.2
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 4.7.0, < 4.9.2
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
4.9.2

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2023-34459

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.37%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۳۰

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Impact

When the verifyMultiProof, verifyMultiProofCalldata, processMultiProof, or processMultiProofCalldata functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.

A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertently for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.

A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (verify, verifyCalldata, processProof, or processProofCalldata), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.

Patches

The problem has been patched in 4.9.2.

Workarounds

If you are using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.

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