نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- نامشخص
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb->data + off). The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory. Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) subsystem. An integer underflow in the bounds-checking logic for network packet buffer pointers allows validation checks to pass incorrectly. A local user capable of running BPF programs could exploit this flaw to create pointers referencing invalid memory, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory access, a denial of service (system crash), or privilege escalation.

