نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- <3.4.10|>=4.0.0,<4.0.7|>=4.1.0,<4.1.7
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 4.1.7
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 4.0.7
- نسخههای متأثر
- <3.4.10|>=4.0.0,<4.0.7|>=4.1.0,<4.1.7
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 3.4.10
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 3.4.10
شرح آسیبپذیری
Impact
RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15() (used by the RSA1_5 key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing InvalidArgumentException as soon as the padding is malformed. It does not implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).
From a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted encrypted_key values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though JWEDecrypter returns the same false in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.
Affected configurations
Applications that register RSA1_5 in their decryption AlgorithmManager and hold an RSA private key.
Patches
PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rejection: on invalid padding (or unexpected recovered length) it returns a random CEK of the expected size selected in constant time, so the full content-decryption (AEAD) step always runs and fails uniformly, removing the observable difference between padding-valid and padding-invalid ciphertexts. Users are still strongly encouraged to migrate to RSA-OAEP.
Workarounds
Prefer RSA-OAEP/RSA-OAEP-256; do not enable RSA1_5 for untrusted tokens.
References
RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2
Bleichenbacher (1998); Marvin attack
CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy
Résolution
Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur 3.4.x, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).
RSA1_5 — déchiffrement PKCS#1 v1.5 avec implicit rejection en temps constant (RFC 3447 §7.2.2) : un padding invalide n'est plus distinguable d'un padding valide, neutralisant l'oracle Bleichenbacher.
Validation : php -l OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs 3.4.x), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue 3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/web-token/jwt-library/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754.yaml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754
- https://github.com/web-token/jwt-framework
- https://github.com/web-token/jwt-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-5739-39v2-5754
- https://github.com/web-token/jwt-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-jc38-x7x8-2xc8
گزارشدهندگان
- magnogaspar

