نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 2.2.0, < 2.36.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2.36.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- >=2.2.0,<2.36.0|>=3.0.0,<3.1.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 3.1.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Description
Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause() builds the LIKE expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in %...% without escaping the SQL LIKE wildcards (%, _, \). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send % to match every row or use _ as a single-character wildcard.
Because searchable_fields defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (BaseEntityAutocompleteType ships with security => false), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose.
Resolution
EntitySearchUtil now escapes \, %, and _ in the user-supplied query with addcslashes() and appends an explicit ESCAPE '\' clause to the generated LIKE expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match words_query IN() branch is unchanged.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/ux-autocomplete/CVE-2026-49211.yaml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh
- https://github.com/symfony/ux
- https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a30007769214
- https://github.com/symfony/ux/security/advisories/GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh
گزارشدهندگان
- Amoifr
- Kocal

