نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 2026.2.15
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2026.2.15
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Vulnerability
In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.
In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account webhookSecret when only the account-level secret was configured.
Typical Use Case Context
Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.
Impact
Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.
Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.
Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.
Affected Packages / Versions
Package: npm
openclawAffected versions:
<= 2026.2.14Patched version:
2026.2.15(planned next release)
Remediation
Add and enforce
tools.sessions.visibility(self | tree | agent | all) across session tools, defaulting totree.Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.
Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.
Fix Commit(s)
c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c
Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- aether-ai-agent

