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OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
< 2026.2.15
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
2026.2.15

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-27004

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.12%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۹

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Vulnerability

In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.

In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account webhookSecret when only the account-level secret was configured.

Typical Use Case Context

Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.

Impact

  • Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.

  • Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.

  • Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: npm openclaw

  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14

  • Patched version: 2026.2.15 (planned next release)

Remediation

  • Add and enforce tools.sessions.visibility (self | tree | agent | all) across session tools, defaulting to tree.

  • Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.

  • Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.

Fix Commit(s)

  • c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • aether-ai-agent