نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 0.9.22-0, < 3.0.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 3.0.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
A high-severity integrity bypass vulnerability existed in Striae's digital confirmation workflow prior to v3.0.0. Hash-only validation trusted manifest hash fields that could be modified together with package content, allowing tampered confirmation packages to pass integrity checks.
Impact
Confirmation package integrity could be bypassed because both content and hash values were mutable in the same trust boundary. An attacker with access to an exported package could alter confirmation data and recompute hashes so hash-only checks still passed.
This affects users relying on digital confirmations as an immutability and forensic chain-of-custody control.
Patches
Patched in v3.0.0.
Upgrade to:
v3.0.0or later
Security behavior added in v3.0.0:
Server-issued asymmetric signatures for forensic manifests
Canonical payload signature verification during import and manual hash verification
Fail-closed behavior when signature metadata is missing or invalid
Signature/key provenance support for audit-related workflows
Workarounds
There is no full cryptographic workaround equivalent to upgrading.
Temporary mitigations:
Treat hash-only validation as a tamper indicator, not proof of immutability
Restrict package exchange to trusted authenticated internal channels
Require out-of-band reviewer attestation for sensitive confirmation workflows
Pause imports from untrusted sources until upgraded
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- StephenJLu

