نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 2026.3.23
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2026.3.24
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Summary
The shared /allowlist command persists channel authorization config through writeConfigFile(...) but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because chat.send is intentionally reachable to operator.write callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy that direct config.patch correctly reserves to operator.admin.
This is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared /config and /plugins writes, but /allowlist was left behind.
Details
The gateway's documented scope split is clear:
chat.sendis a write-scoped action.direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.
The vulnerable path is:
A gateway client authenticates with
operator.write.The client calls
chat.send, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.chat.sendbuilds an internal message context withCommandAuthorized: trueand carriesGatewayClientScopesinto the reply pipeline.resolveCommandAuthorization(...)converts that internal message intoisAuthorizedSender=truein the common case where no strictercommands.allowFromoverride is configured./allowlist add|removeaccepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.The handler clones the parsed config, calls
plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...), validates the result, and persists it withwriteConfigFile(validated.config).No sink-side check requires
operator.adminbefore the persistent write occurs.
That creates a direct control-plane mismatch:
config.patchrejects the same caller withmissing scope: operator.admin./allowlist add dm ...or/allowlist add group ...reached throughchat.sendcan still rewrite channel authorization state.
Impact
A gateway client intentionally limited to
operator.writecan persist first-party channel authorization policy.The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared
/allowlistplumbing.This weakens the repo's documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.
Remediation
1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to /allowlist
Mirror the existing hardened pattern from /config and /plugins.
Before any config-backed /allowlist add|remove write, require:
operator.adminfor internal gateway channels
This should happen before plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...) and before writeConfigFile(...).
2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement
configWrites policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between operator.write and operator.admin.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- zpbrent

