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Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass in Angular SSR

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.21
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
20.3.21
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-next.2
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
22.0.0-next.2
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.3
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
21.2.3

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-33397

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.27%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۹

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in @angular/ssr due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., ///), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (\) bypass.

When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header:

  • An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., \evil.com).

  • The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid.

  • The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a Location header containing /\evil.com.

  • Modern browsers interpret the /\ sequence as //, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain.

Furthermore, the response lacks the Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning).

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:

  • Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.

  • SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.

  • Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.

Patches
  • 22.0.0-next.2

  • 21.2.3

  • 20.3.21

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in their server.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
  if (typeof prefix === 'string') {
    // Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes
    req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});
References

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • VenkatKwest
  • alan-agius4
  • securityMB
  • josephperrott
  • AndrewKushnir
  • dgp1130