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NocoBase has SSRF in Workflow HTTP Request and Custom Request Plugins

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
< 2.0.37
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
2.0.37

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-40346

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.39%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

NocoBase's workflow HTTP request plugin and custom request action plugin make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs without any SSRF protection. An authenticated user can access internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost.

Vulnerable Code

1. Workflow HTTP Request Plugin

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-workflow-request/src/server/RequestInstruction.ts lines 117-128:

return axios.request({
  url: trim(url),  // User-controlled, no validation
  method,
  headers,
  params,
  timeout,
  ...(method.toLowerCase() !== 'get' && data != null
    ? { data: transformer ? await transformer(data) : data }
    : {}),
});

The url at line 98 comes directly from user workflow configuration with only whitespace trimming.

2. Custom Request Action Plugin

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/actions/send.ts lines 172-198:

const axiosRequestConfig = {
  baseURL: ctx.origin,
  ...options,
  url: getParsedValue(url, variables),  // User-controlled via template
  headers: { ... },
  params: getParsedValue(arrayToObject(params), variables),
  data: getParsedValue(toJSON(data), variables),
};
const res = await axios(axiosRequestConfig);  // No IP validation

Missing Protections

  • No request-filtering-agent or SSRF library (confirmed via grep across entire codebase)

  • No private IP range filtering

  • No cloud metadata endpoint blocking

  • No URL scheme validation

  • No DNS rebinding protection

Attack Scenario

  1. Authenticated user creates a workflow with HTTP Request node

  2. Sets URL to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

  3. Triggers the workflow

  4. Server fetches AWS metadata and returns IAM credentials in workflow execution logs

Alternatively via Custom Request action:

  1. Create custom request with URL http://127.0.0.1:5432 or http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin

  2. Execute the action

  3. Server makes request to internal service

Impact

  • Cloud metadata theft: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials via metadata endpoints

  • Internal network access: Scan and interact with services on private IP ranges

  • Database access: Connect to localhost databases (PostgreSQL, Redis, etc.)

  • Authentication required: Yes (authenticated user), but any workspace member can create workflows

پیوندها