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Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

بازه‌ها نیاز به بررسی دارند.

نسخه‌های متأثر
>=3.0.0 <3.1.8
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
3.1.8
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 3.0.0, < 3.1.8
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
3.1.8

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-83805

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.29%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Impact

This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.

  1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the approve/deny actions on ApprovalWorkflowStage. The generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can POST approved responses directly and drive a stage past its min_approvers threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes user and state as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.

  2. Escalated impact job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a ScheduledJob, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through ApprovalWorkflow.save() to on_workflow_approved(), which sets the target job to enabled/active.

Patches

Fixed in Nautobot v3.1.8

Workarounds

Restrict the extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage approve/deny actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • pirate077000