نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 3.39.25
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 3.39.25
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
The /api/users/metadata and /api/users/metadata/:id endpoints in @budibase/server return full global user profiles to any user with POWER role or above. For SSO-authenticated users (OIDC, Google), the response includes oauth2.accessToken and oauth2.refreshToken fields, leaking identity provider credentials to other users who should not have access to them.
Details
When a user authenticates via SSO (OIDC or Google), the OAuth2 tokens are stored in the global CouchDB user document at packages/backend-core/src/auth/auth.ts:170-173:
dbUser.oauth2 = {
...dbUser.oauth2,
...details,
}
await db.put(dbUser)
The user metadata endpoints are protected by PermissionType.USER, PermissionLevel.READ (packages/server/src/api/routes/user.ts:11), which maps to the POWER permission set (packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts:99).
Path 1 — List all users (GET /api/users/metadata):
controller.fetchMetadata→sdk.users.fetchMetadata()(packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:78)→
getGlobalUsers()→getRawGlobalUsers()(packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:101-122) — strips onlypasswordandforceResetPassword→
processUser()(packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15-76) — strips onlypasswordandrolesThe
oauth2field containingaccessTokenandrefreshTokenis never removed
Path 2 — Single user (GET /api/users/metadata/:id):
controller.findMetadata→getFullUser()(packages/server/src/utilities/users.ts:6)→
getGlobalUser()→getRawGlobalUser()(packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:90-92) — raw CouchDB fetch, no field stripping at all→
processUser()— strips onlypasswordandrolesSame result:
oauth2tokens are returned
There is no output sanitization middleware on these routes that would strip sensitive fields before the response reaches the client.
PoC
Prerequisites: A Budibase instance with at least one SSO-authenticated user (OIDC or Google) and a separate user with POWER role in an app.
Step 1 — As the POWER user, list all users:
curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata' \
-H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \
-H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.[].oauth2'
Expected output: null for all users (tokens should not be exposed)
Actual output: For SSO users, the response includes:
{
"accessToken": "ya29.a0ARrdaM...",
"refreshToken": "1//0eXxXxXxXx..."
}
Step 2 — Fetch a specific SSO user's profile:
curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata/ro_ta_users_us_<sso-user-id>' \
-H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \
-H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.oauth2'
This also returns the full OAuth2 tokens.
Impact
A user with POWER role in any app can read all SSO users' OAuth2 access tokens and refresh tokens via the list endpoint, without needing to know individual user IDs.
Stolen access tokens can be used to access external identity provider resources (Google Workspace, Azure AD, Okta-protected services) as the victim user.
Refresh tokens allow indefinite token renewal, persisting access even after the original access token expires.
Additionally,
admin,builder,tenantId,ssoId, anduserGroupsfields are leaked, revealing the full authorization topology of the instance.
Recommended Fix
Strip sensitive SSO fields in processUser() at packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15:
export async function processUser(
user: ContextUser,
opts: { appId?: string; groups?: UserGroup[] } = {}
) {
if (!user || (!user.roles && !user.userGroups)) {
return user
}
user = cloneDeep(user)
delete user.password
+ delete (user as any).oauth2
+ delete (user as any).provider
+ delete (user as any).providerType
+ delete (user as any).thirdPartyProfile
+ delete (user as any).profile
+ delete (user as any).ssoId
+ delete (user as any).forceResetPassword
// ... rest of function
Additionally, getRawGlobalUsers() at line 101 should also strip oauth2 alongside its existing password/forceResetPassword stripping for defense in depth.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/7b8ba11a2c8b233c35e7728dd752dba25ef919a4
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/80a31f6c3354620aa90e50af8a2c614333084621
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19110
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.25
- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f
گزارشدهندگان
- offset

