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Validation of SignedInfo

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نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
= 5.0.0-alpha.12
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
5.0.0-alpha.13
نسخه‌های متأثر
= 1.6.11
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
1.6.12
نسخه‌های متأثر
نامشخص
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2023-49087

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.19%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Validation of an XML Signature requires verification that the hash value of the related XML-document (after any optional transformations and/or normalizations) matches a specific DigestValue-value, but also that the cryptografic signature on the SignedInfo-tree (the one that contains the DigestValue) verifies and matches a trusted public key.

Within the simpleSAMLphp/xml-security library (https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security), the hash is being validated using SignedElementTrait::validateReference, and the signature is being verified in SignedElementTrait::verifyInternal

https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security/blob/master/src/XML/SignedElementTrait.php:

afbeelding

What stands out is that the signature is being calculated over the canonical version of the SignedInfo-tree. The validateReference method, however, uses the original non-canonicalized version of SignedInfo.

Impact

If an attacker somehow (i.e. by exploiting a bug in PHP's canonicalization function) manages to manipulate the canonicalized version's DigestValue, it would be potentially be possible to forge the signature. No possibilities to exploit this were found during the investigation.

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