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WWBN AVideo: Authenticated wallet credit bypass in AuthorizeNet processPayment endpoint

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

Composerwwbn/avideo
نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 29.0
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-47696

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.12%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۳۰

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled amount POST parameter.

The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes $paymentSuccess = true, and then calls YPTWallet::addBalance() without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record.

This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the AuthorizeNet and YPTWallet plugins are enabled.

Details

Affected file:

plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php

Relevant code:

$amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0;
$userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : [];

if ($amount <= 0) {
    echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']);
    exit;
}

// TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API
// Example: Call Authorize.Net API here
// $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData);

// Simulate payment success for now
$paymentSuccess = true;
$users_id = @User::getId();

if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) {
    $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet");
    if ($walletPlugin) {
        $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment');
        echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']);
        exit;
    }
}

Vulnerable flow:

  1. $_POST['amount'] is read from the client.

  2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero.

  3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed.

  4. $paymentSuccess is hardcoded to true.

  5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount.

There is no verification of:

  • Authorize.Net transaction ID

  • payment token

  • webhook signature

  • pending payment record

  • expected server-side amount

  • currency

  • duplicate transaction/replay state

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled

  • YPTWallet plugin enabled

  • Attacker has any valid user account

Steps:

  1. Log in as a low-privileged user.

  2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance.

  3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie:

  curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \
    -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \
    --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc'
  1. The endpoint returns:

  {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"}
  1. Refresh the wallet page.

  2. The wallet balance is increased by 9999.

No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required.

Impact

A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance.

Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to:

  • purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment

  • abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet

  • transfer fake funds to other users

  • manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows

  • bypass monetization controls

Recommended fix
  • Remove or disable processPayment.json.php if it is obsolete.

  • Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied amount alone.

  • Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow.

  • Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling addBalance().

  • Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • proochicken