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متوسط

Tornado vulnerable to HTTP request smuggling via improper parsing of `Content-Length` fields and chunk lengths

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
< 6.3.3
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
6.3.3
نسخه‌های متأثر
نامشخص
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2023-54397

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.38%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۳۰

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

Tornado interprets -, +, and _ in chunk length and Content-Length values, which are not allowed by the HTTP RFCs. This can result in request smuggling when Tornado is deployed behind certain proxies that interpret those non-standard characters differently. This is known to apply to older versions of haproxy, although the current release is not affected.

Details

Tornado uses the int constructor to parse the values of Content-Length headers and chunk lengths in the following locations:

tornado/http1connection.py:445
            self._expected_content_remaining = int(headers["Content-Length"])
tornado/http1connection.py:621
                content_length = int(headers["Content-Length"])  # type: Optional[int]
tornado/http1connection.py:671
            chunk_len = int(chunk_len_str.strip(), 16)

Because int("0_0") == int("+0") == int("-0") == int("0"), using the int constructor to parse and validate strings that should contain only ASCII digits is not a good strategy.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • kenballus