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Summary
Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in plugin.json into .apm/. The manifest fields agents, skills, commands, and hooks are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or ../ traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during apm install.
In the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets plugin.json.commands to an external markdown file. A single apm install copies that outside file into .apm/prompts/ and then auto-integrates it into .github/prompts/secret.prompt.md in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact.
Reviewed version and commit:
apm-cliversion0.8.11maincommit70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a
Details
Root cause:
src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348_resolve_sources()joins manifest-controlledagents,skills,commands, and directory-formhookspaths withplugin_pathit checks only
exists()andis_symlink()it does not resolve the candidate and verify containment inside the plugin root
src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395copies attacker-selected agent and skill files/directories into
.apm/
src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-452copies attacker-selected command and hook files/directories into
.apm/
src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:436-442string-form hook config paths are also copied without a root-containment check
There is already a safer precedent in the same module:
src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:195-210_read_mcp_file()resolves the candidate pathrejects paths escaping the plugin root
rejects symlinks
Reachability:
Local install path:
src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2007-2015local marketplace plugins are normalized through
normalize_plugin_directory(...)
Remote install path:
src/apm_cli/deps/github_downloader.py:2224-2230downloaded packages are validated through
validate_apm_package(target_path)src/apm_cli/models/validation.py:164-172,224-226,304-324marketplace plugins are normalized through the same vulnerable path after clone
Project write-back path:
src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:38-56reads
.apm/prompts/*.prompt.md
src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:170-189writes prompt files into
.github/prompts/
src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2496-2514auto-integrates package primitives after install
This means a malicious dependency can cause APM to read from outside the dependency itself and materialize host-local content into managed install output and, in the verified prompt case, directly into the victim project.
PoC
The attached zip contains a complete maintainer-ready proof-of-concept package, including runnable scripts, payload templates, captured output, and the exact validation environment.
Primary end-to-end apm install reproduction:
Install APM from the reviewed source tree (
apm-cli 0.8.11, commit70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a) into a Python environment.Create an external file outside the malicious plugin directory, for example:
victim\secret.md
with content:
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL
Create a malicious plugin with this minimal
plugin.json:
{
"name": "evil-plugin",
"commands": "D:\\absolute\\path\\to\\victim\\secret.md"
}
Create a minimal
apm.ymlthat references the malicious plugin.Run:
apm install
Observe that APM completes successfully and writes:
.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md
Observe that the resulting prompt file contains the external host file content:
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL
Verified console output from the included PoC:
[>] Installing dependencies from apm.yml...
[+] ./evil-plugin (local)
|-- 1 prompts integrated -> .github/prompts/
[*] Installed 1 APM dependency.
PoC succeeded.
Integrated into project: ...\.github\prompts\secret.prompt.md
Integrated content:
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL
Secondary remote-parity reproduction:
The attached
reproduce-remote-parity.pyexercisesGitHubPackageDownloader.download_package(...)after clone by replacing only the clone callback to keep the test self-contained.It confirms the same unsafe normalization path copies an outside host file into:
<download-target>/.apm/prompts/secret.prompt.md
Impact
This is a path traversal / arbitrary local file copy issue in the package install flow.
Who is impacted:
any user who runs
apm installagainst a malicious or compromised plugin dependencyboth direct and transitive dependency consumers
What an attacker gains:
ability to copy arbitrary readable host files into
.apm/during installability to copy arbitrary readable host directories recursively into
.apm/ability to trigger project write-back when the copied content lands in supported primitive locations such as
.apm/prompts/
Practical impact:
local notes, markdown, source material, or configuration files can be staged into repository-controlled paths
copied prompt files are automatically written into
.github/prompts/, increasing the chance that sensitive or attacker-selected content is committed, synced, or consumed by other toolingthe issue breaks the expected trust boundary that a dependency install should copy only content belonging to the dependency itself
Mitigation
Recommended fix:
Resolve every manifest-controlled component path against
plugin_path.resolve().Reject absolute or relative paths that escape the plugin root.
Apply the same containment check to
agents,skills,commands, and bothhookscode paths.Reject symlinks before copying.
Add regression tests for:
absolute file path in
commandsabsolute directory path in
commands../traversal inagents../traversal inskills../traversal inhooksconfirmation that only in-root files remain accepted
Attachment
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- 0xmrma

